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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
FEDERAL CASES
AGENCY-NOTICE TO AN AGENT

ACTING

ADVERSELY-"SOLE

AcToR."-In Kean v. National City Bank of Memphis,1 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had before it the
always difficult question whether the knowledge of an agent, who
is in fact acting adversely to his principal, will be imputed to the
principal. It appeared that in November, 1920, liberty bonds of
a face value of $466,000 had been stolen from the plaintiff in New
York. In January, 1921, a group of men at Memphis was engaged
in endeavoring to sell liberty bonds there, which were afterwards
shown to be part of those stolen. The president of the defendant
bank was approached by a man who offered to sell $100,000 of
such bonds, or to borrow $80,000 upon them. Both offers were
declined, and the president of the bank warned the active vicepresident of the bank against having anything to do with them
should the offer be renewed. Nevertheless, shortly after this caution, the vice-president instructed the teller to get ready to cash a
draft for a large amount, and presently presented a draft for
$85,000, drawn by a local bank upon its New York correspondent,
and endorsed in blank. The teller cashed this draft, less exchange,
and handed the proceeds to the vice president. Some days later
the vice-president presented a similar draft for $65,000 and this was
also cashed, less exchange, and the money handed to the vice-president. Both of these drafts were duly paid on presentation in New
York, and the bank sustained no loss upon them, and made no profit
beyond the exchange. Upon the same day that the last named draft
was cashed, the vice-president also presented another draft which
he had prepared. It was drawn in the name of the defendant bank
itself, to its order, and was stamped with its endorsement. It was
for $9,202.76, drawn upon a New Orleans banker, and had attached
to it $10,000 of liberty bonds. The teller cashed this draft alsp,
paying the proceeds to the vice-president, and thd draft with bonds,
attached was sent on for collection and duly paid. The New Orleans buyer afterwards testified that he supposed he was buying the
bonds directly from the defendant bank.
It being afterward discovered that the first two drafts cashed
by the defendant bank were given for the purchase price of certain
of the bonds stolen from the plaintiff, and that the bonds attached
to the New Orleans draft were also a part, the plaintiff brought
this action against the bank, seeking to recover upon three grounds:
(1) A conspiracy to get these bonds into the hands of holders for
value, with knowledge that they were stolen; (2) that the several
drafts were purchased with knowledge that they were the proceeds
1. 294 Fed. 214.
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of stolen bonds, for which the bank must account; and (3) that as
to the $10,000 of bonds sold to the New Orleans buyer, the bank
was guilty of a conversion.
Granting that the vice-president of the bank had knowledge
of all the facts, and was acting in collusion with the holders of the
stolen securities, was his knowledge to be imputed to the bank?
As to the first two drafts cashed (to which no bonds were attached).
the court answered the question in the negative. As to these two,
which were presented by the vice-president, who received their
proceeds, the vice-president was not at the time acting for or representing the bank. He presented the drafts for discount as any
stranger might have done; the bank had no interest of its own in
the matter, as to which he acted as its agent, and his knowledge
will not be imputed to the bank. In the current phrase, he was
acting adversely and for the time being had withdrawn from his
agency relation.
As to the third draft drawn upon the New Orleans buyer, the
contrary was held. Since this draft was drawn in the name of the
defendant bank, and to its order, and was endorsed by and paid to
it, it had the appearance, at least, of an act done on its account.
The New Orleans buyer justifiably believed that he was buying the
bonds from the defendant. The bank accepted the proceeds of
the act when the draft was paid:
"The first two transactions were typical sales to the bank, a dealing
with it, apart from any agency. The last was an act on behalf of the
bank, and liability attached, if at all, the moment the bank accepted the
act of its agent by putting the draft through for collection as the
property of the bank. This beneficial interest cannot be retained, and
the agency by which it was acquired repudiated."
There is elaborate discussion of the reason for the exception
to the rule of notice, where the agent is acting adversely, and of
a qualification to that exception where the agent is the "sole actor."
It has been suggested that where the agent was the only person concerned in the transaction, i. e., where he was the "sole actor," his
knowledge is to be imputed, because otherwise it never could be
imputed. This, however, does not seem to be a genuine distinction.
The real distinction would seem to be this: If something of value
has come to the possession of the principal through the act of one
who is ordinarily his agent, he either acquired it as the result of an
act of agency, or he has no title to it at all. He may surrender it
when the facts are brought to his knowledge, but if he elects to
retain it, he must take it as the act of his agent, and be charged with
the agent's knowledge.
Some criticism may fairly be made of the holding of the court
that the New Orleans transaction was to be regarded as the act of
the bank, in this case, because it appeared to be so to the New
Orleans purchaser. That purchaser had sustained no loss, and'was
no further interested in the transaction. There seems to be no
essential difference between this transaction and the others, so far as
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the present plaintiff is concerned. The vice-president in this particular case brought in from the outside certain of the stolen bonds
and attached them to this draft. The defendant bank did not own
these bonds or really undertake to sell them. The vice-president
was not really acting for the bank in the matter. He took advantage of his' position, and the opportunities it afforded, to make a
purely personal act appear as the act of the bank. If anyone had
been misled by this appearance a suitable remedy could be had, but
it is difficult to see2 how it harmed the plaintiff any more than the
other transactions.
A petition for certiorari was dismissed by the Supreme Court.
United States
The most recent case in the Supreme Court of the
3
is Curtis, Collins & Holbrook Co. v. United States, which charged
the agent through whom the
the principal with the knowledge of
4
benefits in question were acquired.
FLOYD R. MECHEm.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SEPARATION

OF POWERi-PbwER OF

PRESIDENT TO PARDON CRIMINAL CONTEPT.-The case of United
States v. Grossman,' decided May 15, considers at large the mooted
question of the power of an American executive to pardon a criminal contempt committed against a court of general jurisdiction.
The precise point at issue was, of course, the power of the President, but, in the absence of controlling special provisions of state
constitutions, the same considerations seem applicable to the power
of a governor, and this was assumed by Judge Carpenter who wrote
the opinion (Wilkerson, J., concurring). On a bill filed by the
United States an order authorized by the Volstead Act had been
issued by the court, temporarily restraining the defendant from
selling liquor in violation of the act. For disobedience of this order
the defendant was found guilty of contempt, fined $1,000, and
ordered imprisoned for a year. The President having pardoned the
imprisonment, the court denied that he had this power.
Judge Carpenter's opinion is strong and elaborate. Its outline is as follows: The power expressly given to the President by
the, ConstitutionL--"to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses
against the United States, except in cases of impeachment"-is confined to offenses declared to be such by Congress. Offenses against
the federal courts, punishable ,as contempts (even though classified
as "criminal" contempt as contrasted with "civil" contempt whose
2. Cases cited from the state courts, upon the
Cook v. American Tubing Co. 28 R. I. 41, 65 Atl. 641,
First Nat. Bank v. Burns 88 Ohio St. 434, 103 N. E.
764; Smith v. Mercantile Bank 132 Tenn. 147, 177 S.

"sole actor" rule, were
9 L. R. A. (N. s.) 193;
93, 49 L. R. A. (N. s.)
W. 72; Tatumo v. Comt-

mercial Bank 193 Ala. 69 So. 508, L. R. A. 1916C, 767.
3. 262 U. S. 215, 43 Sup. Ct. 570.
4. There is elaborate discussion in the opinion and notes in Brookhouse
v. Union Publishing Co. 73 N. H. 368, 62 Atl. 219, 2 L. P. A. (N. s.) 993,
111 Am. St. R. 623, 6 Ann. Cas. 675.
1. (N. D. Ill. E. Div. 1924) ... Fed.

2. (Art. II See. 2.)
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